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HISTORICAL INQUIRY AS A FORM OF COLONIAL REPARATION? 




This symposium asks the question: “Do colonists owe their former colonies 
reparations under international law?” thus revisiting outcomes of the 2001 World Conference 
against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance.
1
 At the Durban 
Conference, it became apparent that claims for historic injustice including colonialism and 
slavery are not easily cast in legal terms given their generic nature and particularly also in 
light of challenges to overcome the inter-temporal principle.
2
 Nonetheless, legal claims and 
other requests for redress have continued to be presented against former colonial powers, with 
increasing frequency in recent years it seems.
3
 The demands have met with a variety of 
responses by States and governments, as also described in Dinah Shelton’s “world of 
atonement”.
4
 The redress that is asked, and very occasionally obtained, is in any event more 
diversified than only reparations in the sense of payments and financial compensation.  
There is thus merit in broadening the symposium question to also envisage other types 
of reparation that may come into play.
5
 The Articles on State Responsibility list satisfaction as 
                                                          
*
 Prof. dr. Larissa van den Herik is Vice Dean of Leiden Law School and professor of public 
international law at the Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies at Leiden University. 
1
 World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related 
Intolerance, UN Doc. A/CONF.189/12, Durban, 31 August – 8 September 2001. 
2
 M. du Plessis, Historical injustice and international law : an exploratory discussion of 
reparation for slavery, 25 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 3: 624-659 (2003). 
3
 See e.g., cases against the UK regarding Kenya and Malaya (Malaysia) in UK courts for acts 
of torture/trespass and regarding the requirement to hold a public inquiry, respectively: Ndiku 
Mutua and Others v. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office [2011] EWHC 1913 (QB) and 
[2012] EWHC 2678 (QB) and Keyu and Others v. Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs and another [2015] UKSC 69; cases against Germany (and earlier in 
2001 against German companies) in US courts based on the Alien Tort Statute, VEKUII 
RUKORO, Paramount Chief of the Ovaherero People and Representative of the Ovaherero 
Traditional Authority and Others against Germany, 5 January 2017. The formal labeling of 
the “Namibian Question” as genocide by the German government only occurred upon explicit 
invitation to do so of the German parliament, Deutscher Bundestag, Antwort der 
Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Niema Movassat, Wolfgang 
Gehrcke, Christine Buchholz, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion Die Linke, Drucksache 
18/8859 (Sachstand der Verhandlungen zum Versöhnungsprozess mit Namibia und zur 
Aufarbeitung des Völkermordes an den Herero und Nama), Drucksache 18/9152, 11 July 
2016. For scholarly reflections on these cases, see D. Hovell, The Gulf between Tortious and 
Torturous; UK Responsibility for Mistreament of the Mau Mau in Colonial Kenya, 11 J OF 
INT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE 223-245 (2013), and A. Buser, German Genocide in Namibia 
in US Courts, VÖLKERRECHTSBLOG, (2017). For an analysis of the claim of Caribbean 
States against several European States, see A. Buser, Colonial Injustices and the Law of State 
Responsibility: The CARICOM Claim for Reparations, KFG Working Paper Series, No. 4, 
August 2016. 
4
 D. Shelton, The World of Atonement: Reparations for Historical Injustices, in NET. INT’L. 
L. REV. 289-325 (2003).  
5
 Cf. Michael Wood, who states that, “the word ‘reparations’ is best reserved for its traditional 
meaning of payments and other transfers of resources imposed, at the end of an armed 




a form of full reparation if the wrongful act cannot be made good by restitution or 
compensation (Article 37, para. 1). Article 37, para. 2 specifies that satisfaction, “may consist 
in an acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology or another 
appropriate modality.” The Articles on State Responsibility also suggest other legal 
consequences, such as the obligation to cease the internationally wrongful act, if it is 
continuing, and the offer of appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if 
circumstances so require (Article 30).
6
 There may be merit in analyzing how these forms of 
reparation and legal consequences could be translated to contexts of colonialism and 
decolonization violence. Yet, from a legal-technical perspective, the legal consequences do 
presuppose an international wrongful act. This may not always be easily construed, despite 
general overall agreement on the wrongs of the colonial project.
7
 Therefore, it is suggested 
that the symposium’s question should be understood as not only seeking to examine legal 
forms of reparation, but also as a trigger to explore how the legal and the non-legal interact, 
and how the non-legal may still offer some sort of general satisfactory reparation in a non-
legal sense, possibly sparked by or coupled with more legal forms of reparation in concrete 
instances. 
On the basis of such a broadened understanding of the symposium’s lead question, this 
contribution considers recent Dutch practice. It presents a series of judgments in which 
individual Indonesian victims claimed reparation from the Dutch State for concrete acts 
committed during the decolonization period. Notwithstanding some remarkable successes 
from a justice perspective, the reparatory effect of these judgments is ultimately limited and 
they cannot be regarded as some kind of precedent for general colonial reparation. 
Nonetheless, the tenor of these serial judgments corresponds with concurrent historical 
findings on the structural nature of the use of mass violence during the Indonesian war of 
independence.
8
 These societal developments, including the litigation, galvanised formal 
efforts to revisit the Dutch decolonization period,
9
 leading to a government funded large-scale 
historical inquiry into decolonisation, violence and war in Indonesia 1945-1950.
10
 Hence, 
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from a broader political and societal perspective, the merit of the Indonesian reparation cases 
lies in their concrete contribution to public debate and to sparking renewed inquiries into 
Dutch colonial past.
11
 The impact of the judgments can thus be said to extend beyond the 
legal. Given this blurring of the legal and the non-legal domains, the question whether 
historical inquiries can also have reparatory effect deserves reflection too. 
A series of reparation judgments on decolonization violence
12
 
The Dutch engagement with its own colonial past in Indonesia, and in particular the 
decolonization war, can in a very general fashion be characterized as one of silence. The 
government, and initially also academia and the media chose not to fully examine this period, 
nor was it standardly integrated in school curricula. After revelations in the media by a 
veteran in 1969, the government produced a policy brief that characterized violence 
committed during the decolonization war (a war better known in the Netherlands under the 
name of “police actions”) as “excesses.”
13
 No prosecutions were initiated and when a law was 
adopted in 1971 removing statutory limitations from the criminal code for war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, no specific provisions were included to ensure possibilities for 
retroactive prosecution of crimes committed during the war of 1945—1949.
14
 This did 
ultimately not prevent civil litigation, and decades later, on 14 September 2011, the Hague 
Court of First Instance delivered judgment in a civil case against the Dutch State determining 
that reparations had to be paid for concrete acts of violence committed during the 
decolonization period in Indonesia (1945-1950).
15
 The case was brought by eight widows of 
men who had been summarily executed as part of a group of 150 by the Dutch army at the 
Kampong of Rawagedeh on 9 December 1947. Obviously, time bars exist in Dutch civil law 
as well and they are absolute. Nonetheless, and extremely exceptionally, the Court found that, 
while strictly speaking the claims were time-barred, it was unreasonable for the State to 
invoke statutory limitations. While initially the court limited its judgment to direct relatives 
being the widows and only set aside statutory limitations for the claims regarding the 
unlawfulness of the executions, later cases did include children in the concept of direct 
relatives and also expanded to other acts, such as torture and rape. In these cases, the courts 
separated the question regarding the reasonableness to invoke statutory limitations from the 
question of proof. Whether reparation will actually be granted in individual cases thus mostly 
remains still to be determined, depending on available proof.  
The judgments, while highly remarkable, cannot be regarded as reparatory justice for 
colonialism per se. Firstly, the cases do not regard the colonial period, but rather the post-
colonial period as Indonesia declared independence on 17 August 1945 and so even the 
qualification of “decolonization violence” may be disputed. Secondly, the cases concern very 
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concrete incidents, not the colonial project or the decolonization war as such. Thirdly, the 
inter-temporal element that complicates discussions of reparation for colonialism generally 
presents less of a bar in these cases, given the smaller time lapse (“only” seven decades) and 
mainly also given that the concrete acts that were litigated were wrongful under law at the 
moment that they were committed as the courts also repeatedly underscored.
16
 
Notwithstanding the relatively limited inherent value of the judgments as precedents 
of reparatory justice for colonialism as such, the Dutch cases did also produce other next steps 
which might have their own reparatory effects. Firstly and in direct reaction to the litigation, 
the Dutch government designed a Civil Settlement Scheme.
17
 While insisting that claims 
relating to this period were time-barred, the government nonetheless expressed a preparedness 
to compensate widows of men who had been victim of summary executions similar to 
Rawagedeh and South Celebes, provided that the claimant proved her case with sufficient 
plausibility.
18
 Secondly, also prompted by the litigation and building on words of regret 
expressed in 2005 by Minister of Foreign Affairs Bot, the Dutch Ambassador in Indonesia 
formally apologised on behalf of the Dutch government. The apologies were rather limited in 
scope though, mainly addressed to widows and zooming in on the violence that was being 
litigated, while also emphasising that harm had been done on both sides.
19
 Thirdly, a few 
years after the first judgment and also in response to new historical publications on the 
structural nature of the violence, the Dutch government decided to fund a comprehensive 
inquiry into the decolonization period, including an analysis of Dutch (dis)engagement with 
this period up until today.  
Historical inquiry as reparation? 
The historical project is ongoing and it raises the question whether such government-
funded, independent historical inquiry can also be regarded as a non-legal form of reparatory 
justice. It is argued here that this can be the case to the extent that such an inquiry satisfies a 
certain quest for satisfaction.  
Both the Articles on State Responsibility as well as the Van Boven/Bassiouni 
Principles recognize that reparation can take different forms. Building on this differentiation, 
States have made the argument that development aid should also be regarded as a form of 
reparation, but the counterargument to this is that aid lacks demonstration of atonement and 
offers insufficient space for victims to inform the nature and contents of reparation.  In 
contrast, government-requested or sponsored yet independent historical inquiry can offer 
those two features depending on precise format and set-up. The Dutch historical inquiry 
involves Indonesian scholars and it also includes a life story project aimed at collecting 
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personal stories and experiences. It can thus be said to reach out and to involve victim 
perspectives in the process. As for the question of atonement, it is clearly not the primary aim 
of the inquiry to act as a “tribunal of history”. Nonetheless, it will be, and already is, 
confronted with discussions on the propriety of the use of legal terms such as war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. This discussion cannot be avoided since, as Isaiah Berlin stated in a 
different setting, the use of neutral language (“Himmler caused many persons to be 
asphyxiated”) conveys its own ethical tone.”
20
 Hence, even in a non-legal setting, discussions 
on whether or not to use legal language tie into deeper questions of acknowledgement. Yet, in 
a non-legal setting, the ultimate quest is not to determine the amount of reparations due. 
Precisely for this reason, a non-legal setting may function less as a straightjacket and thus 
constitute an enabling environment to look into the mirror of history with open eyes. It may 
create a dialogue between different perspectives which may in turn offer more space for 
acknowledgement.  
While independent historical inquiry can never and should never replace judicial 
processes, and at best the two should complement each other, historical inquiry may also have 
its own independent value in a reparatory sense. While legal discussions and judicial 
processes tend to focus on reparation, historical inquiry may instead enlighten on the issue of 
“owing”. And it may well be that if we accept the idea of a principle of owing reparation in 
colonial contexts in the broad sense, the core of this principle lies in the word “owing” rather 
than in the word “reparation.”
21
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